

STAT

✓ 15 JUN 1960  
Mr. John R. Mason




Dear Mr. Mason:

In Mr. Dulles' absence from the country on a brief trip, I want to acknowledge and thank you for your letter of 7 June.

We appreciate your writing and bringing your views to our attention.

Sincerely,



Assistant to the Director

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O/DCI [redacted] rad 15 June 60

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June 7, 1960


Mr. Allen Dulles, Director,  
Central Intelligence Agency,  
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Sir:

The inclosed observations  
are submitted as of possible  
interest.

Sincerely yours,

John R. Mason



# CONSIDERATIONS PERTAINING TO THE U.S. PRESIDENT'S JUNE, 1960 TRIP TO EAST ASIA LOCALES

At the current (June 7, 1960) phase of East-West relations, Premier Khrushchev's vilification of the President having had time to evoke a physical (psychosomatic) reaction within the President's person; with the President's wife hospitalized for a condition that might suggest to Soviet strategists a similar (psychosomatic) reaction; with the President's most publicized social companion, GEO. ALLEN, recently in eclipse as pertains to his heretofore intact record of solidarity with Presidents; and with the news photographs of the President's activities at South Bend and West Point suggestive of exhausted vigor, in considering the build-up of public opposition by Japanese Socialists to the President's program of his

June 19<sup>th</sup> visit to Japan, apprehension should be taken into account as to the probable and possible effects an anti-Eisenhower-U.S. demonstration, of significance, in Japan; then elsewhere on the proposed trip, might have in accelerating the personal physical catalysis of the President; furthermore, anticipation should be taking into account the probable and possible similar anticipatory preparations within the compass of the Kreminites:

1. whether the Soviets desire a physical reaction of severe(st) type to be experienced by the President on the forthcoming trip:

YES

THEY PREFER THE  
PRESIDENT'S REMOVAL

NO

THEY PREFER THE  
PRESIDENT'S CONTIN-  
UANCE.

2. If assessment indicated the

Soviets preferring the President's removal from the political scene, would they incline to contrive aggravation of a suspected psychosomatic decline, by intensifying anti-Eisenhowerisms in Japan and elsewhere on the planned route?

3. Would, in fact, the President, judging from his recent Paris and Lisbon performances, be susceptible to such (a) inadvertent (as far as Soviet interference pertains) anti-Eisenhowerisms, or (b) actually-contrived such experiences? Would any susceptibility the President might undergo be diminished should he be forewarned of such possible Soviet tactic?

4. Could not the Kremlinites elect to attempt, through means of contrivance of anti-Eisenhower-U.S. effects,

a 1960 repeat of their greatest  
fell stroke of the EKATERIN -  
BURG murders of Czar  
Nicholas II and family; of  
their similarly significant  
TROTZKY murder in Mexico,  
by means of such contrivance?

YES

NO

Are there any  
points of similarity  
between the NICHOLAS II  
family, and the  
President and his,  
that might prompt  
such decision?



5. Would an anti-Eisenhower  
incident by Philippine Red(s);  
another by Taiwan, Korean,  
in addition to a massive such  
aggravation, serve cumulatively  
to produce significantly adverse  
physical effects on the President?

World-wide propaganda advantage accessible through anti-climactic effects possible to attempt to catalyze must be expected to tempt Soviet strategists mightily. The 1957 Sputnik advantage could thereby be far surpassed.

Even if without Soviet aggravation a serious physical retardation occurred to the President in consequence of the planned Japanese Socialists' demonstration, would not acute self-condemnation be the counter-reaction of the scrupulously polite Japanese? Would not dismay, on Taiwan induce a Red attack? A North Korean attack? A Berlin coup? A Congo holocaust? Other Red seizures? Communist ascendancy to an uncontrollable level?

Might the May 15<sup>th</sup> world-wide U. S. communications alert prove to have been an "unconscious" curtain-raiser? U-2-Sverdlovsk a syndrome?

John R. Mason



Mr. Allen Dulles, Director,  
Central Intelligence Agency,  
Washington 25, D.C.